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"GENETIC SCIENCE AND MAN": 
NINE VARIATIONS ON A BIOETHICAL THEME 
LeRoy Walters, Ph.D. 
(Ed. Note: Copies of the full 
September issue of Theological 
Studies "Genetic Science and Man" 
may be obtained by writing: Busi-
ness Office, Theological Studies, 
428 E. Preston St ., Baltimore, Md. 
21202. Remittance should accom-
pany order: $2.50 each copy before 
Dec. 1, 1972; $3.00 each copy after 
Dec. 1,1972.) 
The September, 1972 number of 
Theological Studies is a special is-
sue devoted to the theme " Genetic 
Science and Man." 1 According to 
the journal editor, Walter J. Burg-
hardt, S.J., a fuJI year was required 
for the planning and preparation 
of the nine thematic essays. 
Like the previous TS issue on 
abortion, 2 the current special issue 
brings together scholars from a va-
riety of disciplines, in this case 
from the fields of biology, embryol-
ogy, genetics, systematic theology, 
and ethics. It thus provides empiri-
cal data concerning the state of the 
scientific art as weJl as philosophi-
cal and theological reflection on the 
significance of present and future 
scientific and technological develop-
ments. Generally speaking, one can 
detect a progression from the em-
pirical to the theoretical in the struc-
ture of the special issue. The nine 
November, 1972 
essays, in the order in which they 
appear in TS, are: 
I. "Some Recent Developments 
in Genetics," Richard Roblin, Ph.D.; 
2. "Moral Obligations and the 
Fallacies of Genetic Control," Marc 
Lappe, Ph.D.; 
3. "We Can - We Must: Re-
flections on the Technological Im-
perative," Robert T. Francoeur, 
Ph.D.; 
4. " The Technological Impera-
tive: Reflection on Reflections," 
Nicholas Crotty, c.P.; 
5. "Reflections of a Biologist," 
Andrew L. Szebenyi, S.J.; 
6. "The Brink: The Parent-
Child Bond in the Genetic Revo-
lution," John Fletcher, Th.D.; 
7. "Nature and Its Transforma-
tions," Patrick A. Heelan, S.J.; 
8. "Freedom and the Future," 
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John J. McNeill, S.J . ; and 
9. "Genetic Medicine: Notes on 
the Moral Literature," Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J. 
Fletcher 
Of the nine articles, the one 
which focuses most directly on cur-
rent medical practice is John Fletch-
er's study of genetic counseling. 
Fletcher notes that a quiet revolu-
tion in human parenthood has be-
gun to take place, almost without 
our realizing it: For the first time 
in history some parents "are al-
ready crossing a borderline of 
decision-making, venturing out to 
use the knowledge obtainable from 
prenatal diagnosis of genetic dis-
ease in their unborn children." 3 
The author describes the ethical 
dilemmas faced by these first-
generation parents, basing his anal-
ysis on interviews with 25 couples 
who visited a genetic counseling 
clinic in Washington, D.C. 
In the first half of his essay, 
Fletcher distinguishes several 
phases in the genetic-counseling 
process and narrates the thoughts 
and emotions of the prospective 
parents at each stage. The second 
half of the essay, on the other hand, 
summarizes the ethical arguments 
advanced by the parents who chose 
to accept prenatal diagnosis or to 
abort a genetically-defective fetus 
and reflects on the long-term impact 
of such parental decisions. 
Although his article is primarily 
descriptive, Fletcher develops a 
normative position of his own on 
the questions of prenatal diagnosis 
and selective abortion. In general 
terms, his position can be described 
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as restrictive but not absolutist. To 
be more specific, he justifies amni-
ocentesis, but only at the initiative 
of the prospective parents and only 
in the case of at-risk pregnancies. 
He is willing to accept genetic 
abortion but only when three con-
ditions are simultaneously present: 
(I) there is a positive diagnosis of 
a serious genetic abnormality; (2) 
no in utero cure for the genetic de-
fect currently exists ; and (3) the 
birth of a genetically-handicapped 
child would cause "undue hardship 
or misery" to a particular family. 
Thus, Fletcher is willing to justify 
abortion as a last resort in cases 
where grave and proportionate rea-
sons for this drastic action exist. 
His position on abortion seems, at 
least in a formal way, to parallel 
the logic employed in traditional 
Christian discussions of "just war." 
Fletcher's article is a valuable 
contribution to the literature on 
genetics and ethics; throughout the 
essay one finds evidence of both 
careful scholarship and deep com-
passion. Perhaps the most substan-
tial criticism that can be leveled 
is that the very scope of the study 
tends to obscure alternative options. 
Since he limits his investigation 
to at-risk couples who are already 
expecting a child, the possibility 
of such couples voluntarily abstain-
ing from having children is scarce-
ly considered. Indeed, one father 
described in the study explicitly 
mentions, then immediately rejects, 
this option: 
"The fact is that medicine has discov-
ered this test and we needed it. The only 
other way would have been for us not 
to have any more children. Given the 
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choice between that and having one nor-
mal child . . . I wanted to do what we 
could." 4 
A nagging question remains: What 
is the ethical status of such perfectly-
understandable parental desires? 5 
Roblin 
Like Fletcher's essay, Richard 
Roblin's review of "Recent Devel-
opments in Genetics" concentrates 
primarily on the present rather than 
on the future. In Roblin's words: 
"This paper is an attempt to describe 
in simplified terms some recent devel-
opments in the areas of molecular and 
human genetics, with special emphasis 
on developments which are already 
finding medical application, or which 
seem to me to be likely to do so in the 
near future .... I have not described 
works in other important areas such as 
in vitro fertilization or c1oning."6 
After sketching the central find-
ings of Watson, Crick, and subse-
quent molecular biologists, he turns 
to a discussion of three major top-
ics: (I) "large-scale screening pro-
grams for variant human genes"; 
(2) amniocentesis and genetic abor-
tion; and (3) genetic engineering, 
or DNA therapy. While the bulk 
of his essay is devoted to describ-
ing the state of the art scientifically, 
Roblin briefly notes some of the 
ethical questions raised by each of 
the three genetic techniques. 
The essay is a model of compact-
ness. and precision. It provides an 
up-to-date summary of a complex 
field in terms that are readily un-
derstandable to the careful reader. 
By implication, at least, Roblin 
seems to believe that currently 
available genetic techniques pose 
more difficult ethical problems than 
the still-to-be-perfected methods of 
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DNA therapy. His article thus pro" 
vides corroboration for Paul Ram-
sey's view that: 
"The most unquestionably moral means 
of gehetic control (direct medical action 
for the sake of the genotype by some 
"surgical" or chemical mutagent before 
the genotype is produced) is technically 
the most difficult and distant in the fu-
ture, while a number of the means pres-
ently available . . . are of quite ques-
tionable morality." 7 
Lappe 
Four essays in this special issue 
- those written by Lappe, Fran-
coeur, Crotty, and Szebenyi - are 
predominantly futuristic in orien-
tation. Lappe's article constitutes 
a frontal assault on a central tenet 
of much recent writing in the field 
of genetics. He staunchly denies 
that the human race is endangered 
by "genetic deterioration" or an 
imminent "genetic twilight." At 
some points in his essay the author 
seems to argue that, on balance, 
no overall genetic deterioration is 
presently occurring. At other points 
he makes a somewhat more limited 
claim, namely, that the voluntary 
adoption of a series of prophylactic 
measures will serve to halt any cur-
rent trend toward genetic deteriora-
tion. 
To support this central thesis -
in either its strong or its weaker 
form - Lappe attacks several prev-
alent assumptions. First, he ques-
tions whether "genetic load" is a 
meaningful term. Indeed, accord-
ing to Lappe, "genetic load" is 
practically synonymous with "ge-
netic diversity," which is generally 
acknowledged to be of immense 
benefit to mankind. Second, he 
challenges the popular view that 
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modern medicine has generally 
served to increase the percentage 
of genetically-defective persons 
within the human population pool. 
On the contrary, he argues, medi-
cine has had a double effect: Its 
primary impact has been to make 
everyone healthier and to reduce 
the incidence of genetic defects; a 
secondary effect has been to allow 
certain genetically-defective in-
fants to survive and, in some cases, 
to reproduce. 
Turning to the related policy 
question, Lappe advocates the 
adoption of a series of voluntary 
measures which will help to pre-
vent genetic deterioration. Among 
these means are: (I) preventing the 
introduction of new mutation by 
reducing radiation hazards; (2) 
lowering the age of childbearing; 
(3) reducing the number of con-
sanguineous marriages; and (4) en-
couraging public use of genetic 
counseling and prenatal diagnosis. 
It will be up to experts in the 
field of genetics to judge whether 
or not Lappe's empirical assertions 
about genetic deterioration are cor-
rect. One objection which will no 
doubt be raised is that certain genes 
- for example, the gene for Tay-
Sachs disease - are so obviously 
deleterious that they cannot be sub-
sumed under the concept of bene-
ficial "genetic diversity." On the 
whole, however, Lappe's essay 
presents a well-argued challenge 
to a series of received opinions. 
At the very least, he seems to me 
to have demonstrated that there 
is no "clear and present genetic 
danger" which could currently jus-
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tify resort to coercive eugenic mea-
sures. H 
Francoeur 
Robert Francoeur, Andrew Sze-
benyi, and Nicholas Crotty contrib-
ute companion essays on the so-
called " technological imperative," 
the view that whatever can be done 
must be done. Of the three, it is 
Francoeur who conveys the great-
est enthusiasm for human self-
creation through genetic techniques. 
In a brief but fascinating historical 
survey, he illustrates how several 
past achievements in the fields of 
embryology and genetics have con-
tributed substantially to the quality 
of human life. 9 
It is not only the creative ability 
of man-the-maker which inclines 
Francoeur toward accepting the 
technological imperative, however. 
Taking a pOSitIOn diametrically 
opposed to that of Lappe, he claims, 
"Today's medicine has opened the 
door to a pollution of the human 
gene pool which may well be a 
death warrant for mankind." 10 Thus, 
both an imminent crisis and man's 
God-given role as co-creator urge 
man in the direction of controlling 
his genetic destiny. 
Francoeur argues that scientists 
and engineers should enjoy maxi-
mum freedom in their quest to pro-
duce a better future. Explicitly re-
jecting legal or public intervention 
in the domain of scientific research, 
he advocates instead global post-
facto feedback on the consequences 
of new technologies. The author 
also criticizes the efforts of Kass, 
Vaux, Ramsey, and McCormick to 
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impose ethical controls on biomedi-
cal research and technology. In a 
concluding passage which draws 
together numerous strands of his 
essay, he writes: 
"If human nature is not an unchange-
able datum and if we are by divine de-
cree destined to the prime role of direct-
ing and choosing the path of our on-
going creation, then the varied and 
complex possibilities of our reproduc-
tive technology will have to be examined, 
evaluated, and decided on in terms of 
the ever-changing consequences rather 
than on some a priori judgment that 
this or that technique violates some 
assumed God-given nature." 11 
Szebenyi 
Another biologist, Andrew Sze-
benyi, shares Francoeur's skepti-
cism concerning efforts to restrict 
or control science. According to 
Szebenyi, the public has been mis-
led by journalistic scare-tactics; the 
results of such shock-literature are 
irrational anxiety and a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of the role of 
the scientist. 
To counteract such popular reac-
tion, Szebenyi advances two basic 
arguments. First, he asserts that 
science is ethically neutral; it is 
technology which raises value 
questions. In his words: 
" I do not know of any scientific discov-
ery which could be regarded as useless, 
although at the same time 1 do not know 
of any which could not be misused. 
Obviously, it is not the discovery but 
its application that has moral implica-
tions." 12 
Szebenyi's other pivotal thesis is 
that the central aim of genetic en-
gineering is medical and therapeu-
tic, not promethean and sinister: 
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"Designed genetic change, or genetic 
engineering, means the intentional ma-
nipulation of human genes, primarily 
for therapeutic reasons. It certainly 
does not mean the genetic reconstruc-
tion and mass production of custom-
made people. The former is in an ex-
perimental stage, the latter is fiction 
and is not about to happen." 13 
The general tenor of this essay 
stands in marked contrast to that 
of Francoeur. Whereas Francoeur 
celebrates the past and potential 
achievements of biology, Szebenyi 
writes as an aggrieved spokesman 
for a profession which is both ma-
ligned and misunderstood. In oppo-
sition to such prejudice, he express-
es implicit confidence in the work 
of his colleagues: 
"I do not know where our future is go-
ing to lead us, but I am more than hope-
ful because I know so many who fight 
ignorance and live for knowledge." 14 
Crotty 
Nicholas Crotty's essay, "Re-
flection on Reflections," explicitly 
takes issue with several emphases 
of Francoeur. In a more general 
sense Crotty's article constitutes a 
reflective critique of a science (biol-
ogy) by a scholar deeply immersed 
in one of the humanities (theology). 
Crotty warns that scientists are 
not more responsible by nature 
than any other group of mortals. 
He also notes that the powerful do 
not necessarily welcome feedback 
and wonders aloud whether scien-
tists would be willing, for the sake 
of the common good, to accept re-
strictions on their research. Unwill-
ing to foreclose any policy-options 
in advance, he argues that there 
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may be a need for greater control 
of science either through the de-
velopment of professional codes 
of ethics or through the enactment 
of enforceable laws. 
If one seeks the warrant for 
Crotty's critical approach to science, 
one finds it, I think, in his broad 
conception of "the human." In his 
view, "technical reason" and "con-
trolling knowledge" are but two 
aspects of man's cognitive life. With 
Hegel and Tillich, he asserts that 
reason is also a structure of the 
human mind which allows it to 
transform reality . In addition, he 
accuses Francoeur of espousing an 
aprioristic ethic, of basing his judg-
ments on the assumption that "what 
is technologically controlled is eo 
ipso more human." 15 As an alter-
native, Crotty proposes that tech-
niques and actions be evaluated in 
terms of their consequences for 
"human personhood and human 
community." 16 
In a brief postscript to his essay, 
Crotty raises two intriguing ques-
tions. First, he queries, when one 
evaluates reproductive technolo-
gies, how does one distinguish what 
is therapeutic from that which goes 
beyond the therapeutic? Second, 
he argues that human adaptability 
must be taken into account in any 
comprehensive attempt to assess 
the consequences of a technology. 
Applying this general principle to 
the field of genetics, he writes: 
.. . .. If reproductive technology is giv-
en free rein, it will surely mean an end 
to marriage and parenthood as these 
have been known and understood 
throughout human history. A new 
image of marriage and parenthood 
must follow. Do human beings have 
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the capacity to embrace this new im-
age, to involve themselves in the forms 
of "marriage" and parenthood that 
emerge, and in and through all this to 
develop and find fulfillment as human 
persons." 17 
In my view, Crotty has provided 
an incisive critique of Francoeur 
and, by implication at least, of 
Szebenyi. One hopes that in fu-
ture publications the two biologists 
will have occasion to offer their 
rebuttals. A general question which 
remains unclarified in my own 
mind after reading Crotty's essay 
is the following: Is it possible to 
devise sensitive and reliable instru-
ments for measuring the "human" 
consequences of an action or a 
technology? 
Heelan 
Distinctly more theoretical in 
approach are the essays of Heelan 
and McNeill. In his study entitled 
"Nature and Its Transformations," 
Patrick Heelan criticizes the prev-
alent view of nature as something 
external, objective, and given. He 
focuses attention instead on man, 
the subject, who observes and mea-
sures nature. According to Heelan, 
it is preeminently man-the-scien-
tist who initially encounters nature. 
Through mass-production technol-
ogy, however, everyman receives the 
power to observe or control nature 
in new ways. Each extension of such 
human ability in turn effects "a 
permanent change in human na-
ture." 18 
Heelan does not object in prin-
ciple to the notion of technology 
altering human nature. Rather, he 
criticizes the way in which deci-
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sions about technology, including 
genetic technology, are currently 
made. According to Heelan, in con-
temporary America the two most 
prevalent reasons for introducing 
new technologies are the profit-
motive and the quest for military 
superiority. In his view, the con-
tinuation of such a policy portends 
cosmological and moral disaster. 
Indeed, he argues that: 
" . . . there can be no solution that 
does not involve the recognition by the 
scientific community of the dangers of 
irresponsible exploitation of scientific 
information, and the exercise of in-
creased supervision by properly-ed-
ucated, publicly-responsible bodies 
over the forms of applied science that 
are intended for general use." 19 
McNeill 
John McNeill's essay on " Free-
dom and the Future" seeks to devel-
op a theoretical methodology which 
will provide general guidelines for 
specific decisions about the use of 
genetic knowledge. In this quest 
he draws heavily on Maurice Blon-
del's philosophy of freedom and 
moral life. A few sentences near 
the end of McNeill's article provide 
an excellent summary of his " teleo-
logical study of the human will": 
" Man must be understood as evolving 
toward an ideal goal which is necessary 
for him and which he must freely affirm. 
. . . The central goal of man's will, which 
has been discerned in this study, and 
which in turn determines all other con-
ditions of possibility, is man's drive 
toward the unity ofa community of love. 
The necessary conditions for such a 
community were discovered in man's 
self-consciousness, his freedom, his 
positive individuality, his value as end-
in-itself, his ability to transcend what is 
given in terms of the future, and his 
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ability to transcend time in terms of 
an absolute future. This goal and these 
conditions provide the a priori moral 
direction for all human self-creation."2o 
Although Heelan and McNeill 
address different problems and 
employ somewhat divergent theo-
retical frameworks, they both re-
mind us that science and technol-
ogy exist for man rather than the 
reverse. Their efforts to develop 
a philosophy of biology thus pro-
vide a useful complement to the 
more empirically-oriented essays 
in the special Theological Studies 
issue. On the other hand, the tech-
nical philosophical vocabularies 
employed by Heelan and McNeill 
remind us that interdisciplinary 
discussion between the humanities 
and the sciences is always a diffi-
cult task. 
McCormick 
In his bibliographical essay en-
titled, "Genetic Medicine: Notes 
on the Moral Literature," Richard 
McCormick distinguishes three 
primary approaches to the ques-
tion of genetics and ethics: (I) a 
consequentialist calculus (e.g., in 
the writings of Joseph Fletcher); 
(2) a viewpoint which emphasizes 
moral rules (Paul Ramsey, Leon 
Kass); and (3) a mediating approach 
(James Gustafson, Charles Curran). 
To his survey of these authors, he 
appends a "concluding personal 
reflection," in which he expresses 
profound concern about the long-
term human consequences of allow-
ing innovations in genetic tech-
nology - for example, in vitro 
fertilization and cloning - to 
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undermine the institutions of mar-
riage and the family. 
"The family, I would argue, embodies 
the ordinary conditions wherein we 
(parents, children, and others) learn 
to become persons. . . . Through 
monogamous marriage we experience 
the basic (not the only) form of human 
loving and caring, and learn thereby 
to take possession of our own capacity 
to relate in love. That is why marriage 
is a sacrament: It is the human stuff 
eminently capable of mirroring God's 
own covenant-fidelity, His love. It is 
the ordinary societal condition of our 
coming to learn about responsibility, 
tenderness, fidelity, patience, the mean-
ing . of our own sexuality, etc. Without 
its nourishing presence in our midst, 
we gamble with our best hope for growth 
and dignity, our chances oflearning what 
it means to love and be loved." 2 1 
Three qualities of McCormick's 
bibliographical review make it an 
extremely valuable contribution to 
the genetics-and-ethics discussion. 
First, he has structured the debate, 
indicating how the views of most 
ethicists fall under one of three 
categories. Second, he has illus-
trated that the ethical methodolo-
gies employed by writers on this 
subject play a decisive role in de-
termining what conclusions they 
ultimately reach. Finally, in addi-
tion to describing the ethical views 
of other scholars, he offers a criti-
cal appraisal of their work and 
briefly outlines a position of his 
own. 
Summary 
In summary, the nine essays in 
this special Theological Studies is-
sue constitute a significant addition 
to the literature on ethical problems 
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in the field of genetics. Several of 
the articles contain original data or 
novel positions which will have to 
be taken seriously by all future writ-
ers on this topic. There is, to be sure, 
disagreement among the various 
authors. Such divergence of view-
point suggests only that much work 
remains to be done. Indeed, on the 
basis of these nine variations on a 
theme, one can readily formulate 
an agenda of questions requiring 
further investigation : 
1. How can one distinguish be-
tween therapeutic and nonthera-
peutic applications of genetic 
knowledge? 
2. Is genetic deterioration pres-
ently occurring within the human 
gene pool? 
3. What will be the long-term 
social impact of such practices as 
amniocentesis and genetic abor-
tion or in vitro fertilization? 
4. Should genetic decisions be 
left in the hands of families or 
should society or government play 
a larger role? 
5. Should genetic science and 
technology be more carefully mon-
itored and controlled than they are 
at present? If so, by whom? 
REFERENCES: 
I. Theological Studies 33 :3 (Sept., 
1972). 
2. Theological Studies 31 : I (March, 
1970). 
3. Fletcher, " Brink ," p. 457 . 
4. Ibid., p. 476. 
5. For a medical doctor's criticism of 
the idea of "doctoring desires," see 
the recent essay of Leon R. Kass 
entitled, " Babies by Means of In 
Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Ex-
periments on the Unborn ?" N ew 
Linacre Quarterly 
England Journal of Medicine 285 
(Nov. 18, 1971),p. 1177. 
6. Roblin, "Some Recent Develop-
ments," p. 401. 
7. Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: 
The Ethics of Genetic Control 
(New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970), p. 45. 
8. See Lappe, "Moral Obligation," 
pp. 425-427 . 
9. Francoeur, "We Can - We Must," 
pp. 431-433 . 
10. Ibid., p. 437. 
II . Ibid., pp. 438-439. 
12. Szebenyi, " Reflections of a Biolo-
gist," p. 453. 
13. Ibid., p. 451. 
14. Ibid., p. 456. 
15. Crotty, "Reflection on Reflections," 
p.444. 
16. Ibid., p . 442 . 
17. Ibid., p. 448. 
18. Heelan, "Nature and Its Transfor-
mation," p . 497. 
19. Ibid., p. 502. 
20. McNeill , "Freedom and the Future," 
pp. 529-530. 
21. McCormick, "Genetic Medicine," 
pp. 551-552. 
Order Your CHRISTMAS GIFT Subscription NOW! 
The LINACRE QUARTERLY will make an excellent gift for doctors, nurses, 
priests, hospital and medical school administrators, social workers, lawyers, 
dentists, and all concerned with the philosophy and ethics of medical practics. 
SPECIAL CHRISTMAS OFFER: 5 issues for the price of 4. We'll mail this issue 
of the L.Q. to those you designate, plus all four issues in 1973. In addition, we'll 
send an acknowledgment letter informing the recipient that you have sub-
scribed to the LQ for him. Order as many subscriptions as you wish. Be sure to 
list exact name, address and zip codes. 
Enclosed is my check to cover gift subscriptions for the following persons: ($4 for each 
annual subscription). Make checks payable to LIN ACRE QUARTERLY and mail to Linacre 
Quarterly, 2825 N. Mayfair Rd., Milwaukee, Wis. 53222 
Send Subscription to: 
Name _______________________________________________________ ___ 
Address _______________________________________________________ _ 
City ________________________ State/Province ____________ Zip ___ _ 
Your Name _______________________________________________________ _ 
Your Address ______________________________________________________ __ 
Your City _______________________ State ___________________ Zip ___ _ 
Linacre Quarterly 231 
